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In response to a request from worker representatives in Thailand, the WRC has been 
working to address issues surrounding the closure of a factory known as Gina Form Bra 
(hereafter referred to as “Gina”). The factory closed on October 20, 2006 and production 
was shifted to a new facility in China operated by Gina’s parent company. Prior to the 
closure, the Gina factory employed roughly 1,600 workers. Gina has been a manufacturer 
of undergarments for the Limited Brands (whose labels include Victoria’s Secret and La 
Senza), Gap, Calvin Klein, and Charming Shoppes among others.  
Gina is a factory widely recognized within labor rights circles as a rare example of fair 
working conditions and positive industrial relations in the export apparel industry. 
Following a labor dispute that brought the factory to international attention in 2003, Gina 
made unprecedented improvements in the level of respect for labor rights. Most notably, 
following a decision by the majority of the workforce to affiliate with an independent 
trade union, factory management recognized the union and engaged in a process of good 
faith negotiations, leading to substantial improvements in conditions at the factory. This 
included significant increases in wages and benefits, important improvements in health 
and safety conditions in the factory, and the establishment of an effective grievance 
procedure and regular labor-management meetings which proved highly effective in 
addressing labor rights problems as they arose. Over the past several years, Gina has 
stood as an example of the positive improvements that can be made in workplace 
conditions as a result of collaboration among apparel brands, factory management, 
unions, and labor rights advocates in the enforcement of codes of conduct.  
Although the factory has not been involved in the production of collegiate apparel, the 
WRC, in response to the news of the planned closure, decided for several reasons to 
become involved in this case: 1) because of the importance of Gina in the labor rights 
context; 2) because we were asked to intervene by the union that represents workers at 
the factory and by other concerned organizations in the United States, Thailand and Hong 
Kong (where Gina’s parent company, Clover Group, is based); and 3) because we have a 
long-standing relationship with Gina’s primary customer, Limited Brands, and we 
believed we were in a position to influence Limited’s response.  
The initial phase of our inquiry into this case focused on determining the reasons for 
Gina’s closure and whether the decision could be reversed. The closure was announced to 
the workforce in September, at which time Gina management indicated the factory would 
 close on October 31. Production was to be shifted to China where Gina’s parent company 
was opening a new facility.  
Management provided contradictory justifications for the closure, telling workers that the 
closure was due to a preference on the part of Clover’s buyers for goods produced in 
China, while telling buyers that the factory was not profitable and had been operating at a 
considerable loss for some time.  
The WRC sought to determine the veracity of these contradictory claims. With regard to 
the first explanation, that Clover’s buyers had indicated they wanted their goods 
produced in China rather than Thailand, each of the brands involved denied having 
expressed a preference for Chinese-made goods. (Limited Brands did, however, claim 
that it was more expensive to ship their goods from Thailand compared to China, Sri 
Lanka, and some other countries in the region from which they source, and that they 
intended, going forward, to reduce their Thai sourcing). Clover did not provide any 
documentation demonstrating the brands’ alleged preference for Chinese production. 
With regard to the second claim, Clover was unable to provide any documentation 
demonstrating Gina’s alleged financial difficulties. In addition, the factory’s behavior 
over the past year, including negotiating wage increases with the union, contradicted the 
claim that the factory had been losing money.  
Given the lack of any apparent business necessity for closing the factory, and Clover’s 
use of pretexts to justify the closure, the WRC concluded that there was a substantial 
likelihood that a desire to escape the obligation to respect workers’ associational rights 
was a significant motivator for Clover’s actions – which is a violation of the freedom of 
association provisions of the codes of conduct of Clover’s customers. Along with other 
stakeholders, the WRC urged the factory’s buyers to press Clover to keep the Gina 
factory open. Their efforts were unsuccessful, in our view because the brands failed to 
bring sufficient pressure to bear. 
The factory eventually closed on October 20, nearly two weeks before the closure date 
that Clover had originally announced. The closure occurred while a delegation of union 
leaders from Gina was in Hong Kong attempting to negotiate an agreement with the 
Clover Group to keep the factory open. Gina management brought ten police officers and 
approximately twenty people in plain clothes (some of whom had previously been 
identified to Gina workers as government soldiers by Ministry of Labor staff) to forcibly 
remove workers from the facility. In the presence of the military personnel, factory 
management also pressured workers to sign letters of resignation, rather than be 
terminated (under Thai law, the factory’s severance obligations would be far less if 
workers voluntarily resigned their positions, something that was clearly not in the 
workers’ interest to do). It is important to bear in mind that management’s use of military 
intervention to pressure workers occurred in the context of the recent military coup in 
Thailand. The coup has led to strict limitations on dissent and protest of any kind, 
severely restricting the Gina workers’ ability to contest the closure within the Thai 
context. Under these circumstances, Clover’s use of the military to coerce workers who 
had themselves engaged in no unlawful activity, which would be unacceptable under any 
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 circumstances, is particularly egregious. The WRC notified Clover’s customers of these 
violations and urged them to demand an immediate cessation of Clover’s efforts to use 
the military and police to intimidate workers. 
Once the closure was final, the various labor rights organizations involved in the case 
turned their attention to severance payments. As in many countries, although significant 
severance payments are mandated by law in Thailand, workers often do not receive the 
money they are due when a factory closes. In the case of Gina, the issue of severance was 
particularly important because most of the workers are significantly older than the typical 
apparel worker, in their 30s and 40s, and cannot realistically expect to be reemployed in 
the industry.  
The WRC engaged in a series of extensive discussions with Limited Brands in late 
October and early November, pressing the company to insist that Clover fulfill to the 
letter its legal obligations to the workers and that there also be consideration of 
compensation beyond that mandated by law. The latter was warranted in this case 
because of the anti-union motivation underlying the decision to close the factory and 
because of the particular hardships faced by this older group of workers. We also 
communicated with other buyers and coordinated our efforts with a range of 
organizations in Thailand, Hong Kong and elsewhere that were also working on this case. 
Among other steps, we 1) pressed Limited Brands to compel Clover to negotiate directly 
with the union, which Clover ultimately consented to do, after several weeks of 
resistance, and 2) asked Limited to send representatives to Thailand to participate directly 
in the negotiations, which they ultimately did. These efforts, combined with the union’s 
advocacy, produced a positive settlement between the union and Clover, reached on 
November 12.  
There are two Thai laws that regulate the payment of severance upon the closure of a 
business. The first, the Labor Protection Act, stipulates the amount of severance that 
employers must pay when workers are laid off. The required amount ranges from one to 
ten months’ pay per worker, depending on seniority. Clover, under pressure from its 
customers, paid the amount required under this law in full immediately following Gina’s 
closure on October 20; the payments totaled roughly $2.3 million, or an average of eight 
months’ salary per worker. The second law, the Labor Relations Act, regulates payment 
of contractual bonuses and other negotiated payments that are due workers in the case of 
a factory closure. According to this law, which is violated with great frequency by Thai 
employers, Gina workers were owed roughly $500,000 in additional payments. Clover 
did not make these payments upon the closure of the factory, but ultimately agreed to do 
so as part of the November settlement. Under the terms of the settlement, Gina workers 
will receive additional compensation totaling $1.6 million. This covers the $500,000 the 
workers are owed under the Labour Relations Act, plus $1.1 million in additional 
severance. This corresponds to roughly 3 ½ months' additional salary for each worker. 
The amounts involved are unprecedented for a factory closure in Thailand, where it is 
rare for workers to receive even the compensation to which they are entitled by law.  
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 Overall, the results of the Gina case can only be viewed as mixed. On the one hand, it is 
very positive that workers will receive not only their full terminal benefits, and the other 
unpaid compensation, but also additional compensation above that, which should provide 
the workers and their families with at least a financial cushion as they undertake the 
difficult task of finding new employment. At the same time, Gina serves as another 
example of a factory that made great progress (and in this case was a recognized symbol 
of the potential for effective code enforcement) and then was shutdown within the space 
of a few years. The tendency for factories that genuinely respect the rights of their 
employees to lose business from brands and retailers and/or to be shut down by their 
parent companies so that production can be shifted to other facilities with lower labor 
costs and inferior labor conditions, is obviously highly damaging to code enforcement 
efforts in the apparel industry.  
The performance of the key buyer in this case, Limited Brands, was also mixed. In our 
view, had Limited Brands applied greater pressure than they were ultimately willing to 
apply, Clover might have been compelled to keep the Gina facility open. Unfortunately, 
Limited Brands was itself unenthusiastic about maintaining production in Thailand of the 
type of underwear produced by Gina, despite the importance of Gina as a key example of 
the positive of impact of Limited’s code of conduct enforcement efforts. This clearly 
dampened Limited’s willingness to act aggressively to keep the factory open. At the same 
time, pressure from Limited was instrumental in achieving the severance settlement, 
which was a substantial accomplishment, even though the final amount was below what 
the NGOs involved in this case had hoped would be paid. It is also important to note that 
Limited Brands played a critical role in the efforts in 2003 that led to the labor rights 
breakthrough at Gina. It is fair to say that, relative to the industry norm, Limited’s overall 
record at Gina is a clearly positive one. When measured against a different standard, the 
full protection of the rights of workers, including the right to form a union without fear 
that this will lead in relatively short order to factory closure and the loss of one’s job, 
Limited’s efforts at Gina cannot be viewed as a success. More could have (and under 
Limited’s own code of conduct, should have) been done.  
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